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Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and

the Background Right to Effective Democratic
Governance
DONALD L. BESCHLE*

INTRODUCTION

Courts and commentators engaged in constitutional analysis widely accept
the proposition that federal constitutional norms should be uniform throughout the nation. While no consensus exists on whether various substantive
constitutional principles should be applied broadly or narrowly, few dispute
the claim that whatever the substantive outcome, it must be applied consistently. Diversity should be expected, perhaps even encouraged, in matters
of state law, both statutory and constitutional.' However, most courts and
commentators agree that federal law should mean the same thing regardless
of the forum.
Nevertheless, legal scholars have rarely inquired into why federal law
should have the same meaning in every forum. Instead, the value of uniformity has generally been treated as self-evident. Tolerance of diverse interpretations of federal constitutional provisions calls forth images of
nullification and other pre-Civil War concepts of federal-state relationships
long since rejected by history. 2 Justice Holmes' comment that the Supreme

* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. L.L.M., 1983, Temple
University School of Law; J.D., 1976, New York University School of Law; B.A., 1973,
Fordham University.
1. The legitimacy of local diversity of state law, even when it touches on federal interests,
extends at least as far back as Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
The value of the diversity of state legislation has been hailed by political conservatives. See,
e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). In some instances, it also has been hailed
by political liberals. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). However, support often
depends on which level of government was acting to regulate private activity.
The importance of diversity in state constitutional law has recently been recognized as a
counterweight to narrow application of individual tights provisions of the Federal Constitution.
See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 96 HAv. L. REv.
489 (1977).
2. Nullification was the contention that a state government had the "unquestionable right
to judge" the constitutionality of acts of the federal government. And, if the state courts
concluded that the acts were unconstitutional, then nullification gave them the right to strike
"all unauthorized acts done under color of [the Constitution]." Resolution of the Kentucky
Legislature (Nov. 14, 1799), reprintedin VIRGINIA CoassIo N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT,
VE THE STATES 155 (1964).
Nullification was closely linked to the theory that states had the right to secede. Both
theories were, of course, defeated less by legal argument than by force of arms during the
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Court's power to review state statutes challenged on federal constitutional

grounds is more essential than its power to review the constitutionality of
federal statutes 3 may be the most famous remark expressing the fear of
judicial balkanization of constitutional standards.
Attempts to go beyond reflexive rejection of diversity in constitutional
standards to reach a reasoned elaboration of that position generally rest
upon the supremacy clause.4 But that clause, while clearly a bar to state

interference with the operation of federal constitutional or statutory law, is
only a limited mandate for uniformity. The most common coritemporary
applications of the supremacy clause involve questions of whether federal
law preempts state statutes addressing the same subject. In that context,
although conflict with federal goals is impermissible, the supremacy clause

clearly does not prohibit diverse state approaches which do not interfere
with simultaneous enforcement of federal law. 5 If states may supplement
federal legislation, how does the supremacy clause bar state or lower federal

courts from not only protecting, but also enhancing, federal constitutional
guarantees through broader interpretation? Granted, interpretation of federal
law is a different process than comparing federal law to parallel state law,
but in what sense are federal aims frustrated by overextension of the federal

norm in either case?
Two arguments, primarily utilitarian in nature, are commonly put forward
in response. First, it may be argued that the Constitution cannot be allowed
to "mean something different in each of the fifty states." ' 6 This argument,

Civil War.
The war had ...roused the spirit of nationality, until then but half conscious,
into vivid life and filled every country-side of the North and West with new ardor
for that government which was greater than the government of States.... It was
not a theory of lawyers that had won.., but the passionate beliefs of an efficient
majority of the nation ....
10 W. WILsoN, A HISTORY OF Tm AMERicAN PEoPLE 14 (1918).

3. "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare
an act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States." 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29596 (1920).
4. The need for uniformity "finds its roots" in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816). Martin established the power of Supreme Court review over state court
decisions, a power based in the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 348-50. See also Schlueter,
Federalism and Supreme Court 'Review of Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to
Unfortunate Impressions, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523 (1984). For a summary of the history
of Supreme Court review of state court decisions, see Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalism

and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45
MONT. L. REv. 177 (1984).

5. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)
(state licensing scheme for nuclear power plants not preempted by Federal Atomic Energy Act);
DeCana v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (state statute prohibiting employment of illegal aliens not
preempted by Federal Immigration and Nationality Act).

6. Resolution Relating to Proposed Legislation to Restrict the Jurisdictionof the Federal
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however, is less an explanation of the value of uniformity than a restatement
of the cornclusion that it is valuable.
The second argument states that to permit nonuniformity will lead to
"confusion... as to whether and how federal acts will be enforced ' 7 from
state to state. The importance of such confusion may well be overstated.
The narrowest possible reading of the supremacy clause assures that states
cannot undercut federal guarantees, but at most may supplement them. In
addition, uncertainty over how far beyond minimum standards a state might
go would be no more confusing than any other unsettled question of law
which has yet to be resolved by a state's highest court. The federal system
already tolerates a significant amount of "confusion" on the scope of
individual rights and the validity of state statutes, given the increasing willingness of state courts to expand such rights through reliance on state
constitutional provisions analogous to federal guarantees. 8 With all these
factors already present, it is difficult to understand how permitting nonuniform, expansive readings of federal constitutional provisions would unacceptably add to current uncertainty.
Still, judicial support for the principle of uniformity remains strong-far
stronger than the explanations put forward for it. This Article will not
dispute the importance of uniformity in the interpretation of constitutional
rights provisions, but will attempt to articulate a more satisfying rationale
than those commonly cited. This suggested rationale rests on the proposition
that the people have an interest in the effective implementation of legislative
decisions which do not violate constitutional prohibitions. This interest,
created by the Constitution itself, is legitimately viewed as a right-a right
to government institutions which, except insofar as limited by the Constitution, are basically democratic in nature.
The right of the citizen to effective implementation of democratic outcomes
is, of course, properly subordinated to the individual rights created by the

Courts, Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Williamsburg, Virginia (Jan. 30, 1982),
reprintedin 128 CONG. REc. S.2242 (Mar. 17, 1982), cited in Schulueter, supra note 4, at 545.
This language dates to Martin, where the Supreme Court stated that if federal law "might,
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states,
[t]he public mischiefs that would attend ... would be truly deplorable." 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
at 348.
7. Resolution Relating to Proposed Legislation to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, supra note 6.
8. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 491. A recent prominent example involves New York
State's attempt to close an "adult" bookstore as a public health nuisance after determining
that solicitation and performance of sexual acts took place on the premises. In Arcara v. Cloud
Books, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the first amendment did not
prohibit such a closure. Id. at 3178. The New York Court of Appeals then applied the free
speech provision of the state constitution, N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, and unanimously held that
the remedy of closing the bookstore went beyond the state's legitimate interest in enjoining
illegal activity, and would therefore violate the defendant's rights. People ex rel. Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986).
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Constitution, which may be asserted against majorities. The scope of those
rights will undoubtedly continue to be the source of sharp controversy.
Expansion of individual rights may well reflect the evolving understanding
of those rights not only by courts, but by the people as a whole. Such
outcomes are clearly consistent with the overall constitutional scheme. However, expansive readings of individual rights provisions which are idiosyncratic, and which depart from contemporary views of what the provision
means nationwide, not only interfere with the utilitarian benefits derived
from the invalidated government practice, but on a deeper level deprive the
citizens of the state involved of their right to effectively govern themselves
within constitutional limits. It is this background right to an effective democracy within constitutional limits, the explicit recognition of which would
have a significant effect on constitutional interpretation as a whole, which
provides the foundation for the value of uniformity in constitutional interpretation.
This Article will first examine recent Supreme Court pronouncements on
the need for uniformity in constitutional interpretation, as well as prominent
critiques of those decisions. It then will discuss the constitutional structure
and the rights, obvious and latent, created by that structure. Finally, this
Article will discuss the implications of the right to effective functioning of
the democratic system, along with some caveats about its application.

I.
A.

Tirs CURRENT DEBATE OVER UNIFORMITY

The Supreme Court Defends Uniformity: Long and Hass

The most important recent Supreme Court statements on the value of
uniformity in federal constitutional interpretation are Oregon v. Hass 9 and
Michigan v. Long.10 In Hass, the defendant had been arrested for burglary,
and given full Mirandawarnings. During the ride to the police station, Hass
asked to telephone a lawyer and was told that he could do so only after
reaching the station. Before reaching the station, however, he provided the
police with information which the prosecution later sought to introduce at
trial to rebut the defendant's contrary testimony." The Oregon Supreme
Court, in reversing the conviction, held that the admission of the statements

9. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
10. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
11. Hass, 420 U.S. at 717. Clearly, such evidence was inadmissible during the prosecution's
case in chief under the principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, in
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court limited the scope of Miranda in holding
that "[i]t does not follow ... that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's
case in chief is barred for all purposes .... " Id. at 224. The Court also held that, at least
in certain circumstances, it could be used to impeach the credibility of defendant's testimony.
Id.
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made in the police car violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 2
In its opinion reversing the Oregon courts, the United States Supreme
Court dealt with the argument that a state had the power to extend individual
rights against government action further than federal courts might do in the
same circumstances. While the states' power to do so as a matter of state
constitutional law was affirmed,' 3 the Court held that "of course, a State
may not impose such greater restrictions [on government] as a matter of
federal constitutionallaw when this Court specifically refrains from imposing
them." 1 4 Apart from the citation of some lower court decisions to that
effect, the Court's entire explanation of its holding on this point is the
phrase "of course."
Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting, felt compelled "to add a word
about this Court's increasingly common practice of reviewing state-court
decisions upholding constitutional claims in criminal cases."" The dissenters
felt that it was "much the better policy to permit the state court the freedom
to strike its own balance between individual rights and police practices, at
6
least where the state court's ruling violates no constitutional prohibitions."'
While this statement was made to support the argument that the state court
decision should have been presumed to be based on state law, it might also
be applied to the question of whether federal courts should be concerned
about state court overextension of federal constitutional rights.

12. State v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973). In Hass, the Oregon Court distinguished
Harrison the grounds that there, "insufficient or no warnings were given," while Hass had
received proper warning. 267 Or. at 492, 517 P.2d at 673. Although on its face this makes the
Oregon police more sympathetic actors, the court felt that after giving proper warnings, the
police would have "had nothing to lose and something to gain by [then] violating Miranda
unless they know that subsequent evidence is absolutely excluded." Id.
13. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719. The Oregon Courts, with Justice Hans Linde as their most
prominent spokesman, see, e.g., Linde, E. Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts,
18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984), have taken the lead in extending state constitutional rights provisions
beyond their federal counterparts; Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. Rnv. 379 (1980). See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 67 Or. App. 608, 680
P.2d 666 (1984) (no "fighting words" exception to state freedom 6f speech provision); Hewitt
v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 294 Or. 33, 653 P.2d 970 (1982) (gender classifications
subject to the same strict scrutiny as are racial classifications for equal protection analysis). In
the wake of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), even when adopting a similar rule, the
Oregon Supreme Court now goes out of its way to make clear that it is applying state law,
and the Court uses United States Supreme Court cases only as persuasive precedent. See, e.g.,
State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268, 274, 721 P.2d 1357, 1360-61 (1986).
14. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719. The Oregon Supreme Court clearly believed otherwise. In Hass,
the defendant relied upon State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974). "If we choose
we can ...[interpret] Article 1, § 9 of the Oregon constitutional prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures as being more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment of the federal
constitution. Or we can interpret the Fourth Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court." 270 Or. at 182, 527 P.2d at 1208, quoted in Hass, 420
U.S. at 719 n.4.
15. Hess, 420 U.S. at 726 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
16. Id. at 728.
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Long involved a police search of a car stopped for a speeding violation,

which resulted in the discovery of marijuana. The Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence had been
obtained illegally.17 The state court opinion was unclear as to whether its

basis for this holding was state law, the fourth and fourteenth amendments
of the federal constitution, or both state and federal constitutional law.
Before proceeding to the merits of the defendant's fourth amendment
argument, the United States Supreme Court addressed the contention that
it lacked jurisdiction under the doctrine of adequate and independent state
grounds. This long-standing jurisdictional rule restrains the Supreme Court
from addressing federal constitutional issues presented in a case coming from
a state's highest court where the state court decision would stand based upon

state law alone.'
Application of this doctrine is both easy and uncontroversial when the
state court opinion is clearly based upon state grounds or, conversely, when

it is clear that the outcome is based upon federal law.' 9 But for many years,
the proper approach when the basis of the decision was ambiguous was in

dispute. At different times, the Supreme Court advocated dismissal of any
case not clearly lacking independent state grounds, 20 remand of the case to

clarify the actual basis of the state court's decision, 2' or an independent
assessment of the case, by the Supreme Court itself, to determine whether
adequate and independent state grounds were present. 2 Each of these ap-

proaches carries both advantages and disadvantages.2 However, each is more
deferential to the possible existence of an independent state interest than the
approach chosen in Long.

17. People v. Long; 413 Mich. 461, 329 N.W.2d 866 (1982). In Long, the defendant was
stopped for speeding. The police had reason to suspect that he was "under the influence of
something." The defendant had left the car and had been subjected to a pat-down search for
weapons. Police saw a four-inch knife on the floor of the car, then shined a flashlight into
the car to search for other weapons. After lifting an armrest, police found an open leather
pouch containing a small plastic bag of marijuana. 413 Mich. at 468-70, 320 N.W.2d at 868.
18. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 329 U.S. 117 (1945), Justice Jackson found the rule to flow from
the constitutional requirement that federal courts act only upon cases or controversies. Any
judgment attempting to correct state law would be nothing more than an advisory opinion.
See C. Wioinr, FEDERAL CouRTs ch. 12 (4th ed. 1983).
19. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973) (Supreme Court has
jurisdiction where state court clearly decided on federal grounds); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966) (no jurisdiction where state court invoked state procedural rule).
20. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
21. See, e.g., Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
23. These are discussed by the Court in Long, 463 U.S. at 1037-40. Outright dismissal
grants deference to state courts, but it risks creating confusion over the scope of federal law.
The United States Supreme Court, when examining the scope of state law, promotes uniform
interpretation of federal law, but risks incorrect decisions based upon a body of state law
unfamiliar to the justices. Remand for clarification promotes ultimate accuracy, but is inefficient.
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The Court held that in ambiguous cases, it would assume that adequate
and independent state grounds did not exist. 24 Whatever the "passive virtues"
associated with other approaches, they apparently were outweighed by the
Court's determination that states should not be granted the power to interfere, even inadvertently, with the uniform national interpretation of federal
constitutional provisions.25 Legitimate state interests, said the Court, could
be protected through the simple act of the state court explicitly stating, where
26
appropriate, that it was relying upon independent state grounds.
In recent years, then, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the necessity of
uniform interpretation of federal constitutional provisions. In addition, in
Long, the Court took steps to eliminate the inconsistent application of such
provisions even where the decision would likely be seen in other states as
an inconsistency dictated by state, rather than federal, law. Yet, typically
on this matter, the Court did not feel compelled to explain the need for
uniformity in either Hass or Long, apparently believing that it was too
obvious to require elaboration.

B.

Critiques of the Need for Uniformity

A few voices have challenged the proposition that uniform interpretation
of federal constitutional provisions is always necessary, or even wise. Justice
Stevens set forth his position in his Long dissent. There, he argued that
uniformity in the enforcement of constitutional rights is clearly called for
to the extent that all states must provide the individual with the minimum
degree of protection assured by Supreme Court decisions. But if a state
court chooses to be more generous to the individual, Justice Stevens contends
that no serious federal interest is compromised by deference to that state's
decision.27 In Long, he stated:
The reason may be illuminated by assuming that the events underlying
this case had arisen in another country, perhaps the Republic of Finland.
If the Finnish police had arrested a Finnish citizen for possession of
marijuana, and the Finnish courts had turned him loose, no American
would have standing to object. If instead they had arrested an American
citizen and acquitted him, we might have been concerned about the arrest
but we surely could not have complained about the acquittal, even if the
Finnish court had based its decision on its understanding of the United
States Constitution. That would be true even if we had a treaty with
Finland requiring it to respect the rights of American citizens under the
United States Constitution. We would only be motivated to intervene if

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1040-41.
Id.
Id. at 1041. State courts have followed this suggestion. See supra note 13.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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an American citizen were unfairly arrested, tried, and convicted by the
foreign tribunal32
In short, Justice Stevens sees the case for uniformity as resting upon the
need to protect federal interests, including the individual's federally guaranteed rights. Under these circumstances, he contends, uniformity is needed
only "to vindicate federal rights." 29 No federal interest is challenged by
overenforcement of individual rights, and therefore the proper attitude of
the federal courts in such cases should be one of disinterest.
Professor Lawrence Sager has set forth a more nuanced critique of the
need for uniformity. ° He contends that the failure of a court to extend
constitutional protection is often based not upon a conclusion that the
constitutional provision relied on would not support the claimed right, but
rather upon various non-analytical, institutional grounds. Institutional reasons for limiting enforcement of individual rights provisions generally involve
the belief that it would be inappropriate to extend the right in light of the
31
practical difficulties or consequences of such an action.
Where the Supreme Court has apparently refused to expand constitutional
protection of the individual based upon institutional grounds, Professor Sager
would recognize the constitutional norm in question as "underenforced." If
a state court chooses to go beyond the level of federal enforcement with
respect to such norms, the Supreme Court should not, he contends, feel
compelled to interfere. Such state interpretation of federal constitutional
provisions would not violate any constitutional norm, but merely indicate
that an independent sovereign court system feels less constrained by institutional limits than does the Supreme Court. 2
To Professor Sager, the loss of uniformity would not be a decisive objection to such decisions. Uniformity is unimportant in itself, and required
only where nonuniformity would damage some independent government

28. Id. at 1068.
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARv. L. Rv. 1212 (1978).
31. Institutional reasons are those "based upon questions of propriety or capacity." Id. at
1217. Professor Sager does not attempt to provide a laundry list of institutional reasons. They
seem to be the types of things that the Supreme Court has explicitly taken into account in
determining that something is a nonjusticiable "political question." See, e.g., Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962). Professor Sager explicitly refers to the arguments for'abstention by federal
courts put forth by Alexander Bickel in praise of the "passive virtues." See A. BiICKL, THE
LEAST DANcEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPRmMt COURT AT m BAR OF POLITICS (1962). However,
Professor Sager believes that these justiciability issues are not always described as such, but
rather cause courts to limit the substance of various constitutional concepts.
32. Sager, supra note 30, at 1248-50. Professor Sager also contends that Congress can and
should use its power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to go beyond the point
at which the Court has stopped enforcing, for institutional reasons, the substance of the
amendment. This part of his argument is not directly relevant to the issues discussed in this
Article, and is not inconsistent with the thesis set forth here.
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interest. Increased vigor by state courts in guarding federal rights, even
beyond the protection extended by federal courts, would be and should be
33
of no concern to the federal courts.
Both Justice Stevens and Professor Sager reject the notion that uniformity
in constitutional interpretation is always an important goal, but their positions differ significantly. Professor Sager limits his endorsement of nonuniformity to cases where federal courts have set limits for institutional
reasons. He sees cases involving police practices, such as Hass, as generally
decided upon analytical grounds. That is, rather than simply refusing to
enforce the full measure of an individual right, the Court has chosen to
mark the constitutional boundary between that right and the legitimate
interests of the state. In such cases, uniformity remains important. Justice
Stevens seems to go further. His dissent in Long appears to maintain that
excessive zeal in protecting individual federal rights by state courts simply
presents no genuine federal problem, at least where the countervailing interest
34
asserted is that of a state, rather than the right of another individual.
Arguments against the importance of uniformity in interpretation of federal constitutional provisions, while uncommon, are initially attractive. This
is true principally because the defenders of uniformity so often have not
bothered to explain its value, but have merely asserted it as self-evident. Is
Justice Stevens correct in his position that state-court extension of federal
constitutional rights should be of no concern to the Supreme Court, or is
Professor Sager's more nuanced position (that this is only sometimes true)
valid? Defending uniformity against either or both positions requires a convincing explanation of why constitutional values demand uniform application
of federal constitutional guarantees.
II.

WHY UNIFORMITY?

The importance of uniformity in constitutional interpretation can be assessed only against a more general understanding of the nature and structure
of the constitutional system. The central paradox of the United States Constitution is that it simultaneously grants and restricts government power.

33. "Unless competing constitutional concerns are at stake, there would seem to be no
occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state courts against overly generous

interpretations of federal constitutional values ....

" Id. at 1249. Nonuniformity, in itself, is

not an effective objection to this proposition, since broad, nonuniform readings of individual
rights, when based on state law grounds are not only tolerated; "we often consider it a virtue."
Id. at 1251.
34. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. According to Professor Sager, some

provisions of the constitution do not call for "underenforcement analysis," including the fourth
amendment (at issue in Long) "which explicitly calls for a case-by-case balancing of state and
private interests." Sager, supra note 30, at 1244 n.104. Underenforcement for institutional,
rather than analytical reasons, is most likely with respect to equal protection and substantive
due process claims. Id. at 1245 n.105.
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Unlike the Magna Carta, it was not a document meant to weaken a previously
powerful ruler, but rather was intended to strengthen institutions perceived
as ineffective at the time. Yet the powers granted are seriously restricted by
procedural restrictions and substantive prohibitions; the same governmental

power which was desired was also feared and restricted.
While the grants of power and the restrictions on power were inextricably

linked in the same document, the common justifications for each have tended
to differ in at least one central way. Limits on government power are

generally justified as necessary to protect individual rights, rights commonly
seen as preceding the establishment of any government structure, or at least
preceding that particular structure established in 1787.15 Grants of govern36
ment power, on the other hand, are usually justified on utilitarian grounds.

Since its inception, the Constitution has generally been interpreted as an
attempt to balance the practical benefits attainable only through strong
government institutions against the threats that such institutions will inevitably pose to the freedom of individuals, families, or other groups of citi37
zens.
Although these premises have often served constitutional analysts well,
they also create some difficulties. Despite the best efforts of such widely

diverse thinkers as those of the "law and economics" school, who often see
rights as based in utilities, 3 or scholars classified as members of the Critical

35. Thus, the prevailing view is that the principles of the Bill of Rights and the Declaration
of Independence were rooted in theories of natural law and natural rights, particularly as
developed by John Locke. See generally Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American
ConstitutionalLaw, in 1 CoRwiN ON THE CoNsTrrTrioN 79 (R. Loss ed. 1981). John Reid, on
the other hand, argues that the colonists saw themselves as acting not on the basis of natural
law, but rather to assert positive legal rights of English subjects, "established by custom and
proven by time." Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in LAW iN TnE AMERiCAN REvoLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN TBE LAw 46, 61 (H. Hartog ed. 1981). Each theory maintains,
at least, that certain rights pre-dated 1787. Whether individual rights are seen to flow from
natural law and Lockian reasoning from first principles, or from history, custom and general
acceptance through time will, of course, be of enormous importance in the task of defining
the list and scope of those rights. See infra Section III.
36. Hamilton, in the first of the Federalist papers, states his general purpose as being "to
discuss ... [tihe utility of the UNION to your political prosperity-[tJheinsufficiency of the
present Confederation to preserve that Union-/the necessity of a government at least equally
energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object. . . ." TBE FEDERAIsT PAPERS
No. 1 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). Thus, grants of power were desirable only insofar
as they efficiently brought about other goods, including "additional security ... to the preservation of [republican] government, to liberty, and to property." Id.
37. This is true not only in the United States, but in every government committed to
constitutionalism. "Constitutional history is usually the record of a series of oscillations. At
one time private right is the chief concern of the citizens; at another the preventing of disorder
that threatens to become anarchy .
C. McILwAiN, CoNsTnuONALiSM: ANCIENT AND
MODERN 136 (1947).
38. See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUsticE (1981). Posner sees wealth maximization as a "foundation not only for a theory of rights and remedies but for the concept
of law itself." Id. at 74.
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Legal Studies movement, who see rights as radically contingent rather than
universal,3 9 the general outlines of western natural rights theory relied upon
by the framers continue to dominate constitutional analysis. Under this
approach, as long as limits on government power are seen as protecting
rights and grants of government power as protecting utilities, then limits
will be, at least in theory, uniformly valued over grants.
Traditionally, all legal claims have been divided into two supposedly distinct categories, rights and interests. Rights, while preferably given explicit
recognition in positive law, are based in something preceding that law, and
usually preceding even the community which enacts the positive law. That
something has most commonly been designated as God, nature, or the
primacy of the individual. 40 Arguments for incorporating rights into positive
law are seen as properly limited to-rational deductions from initial universal
propositions about human nature. Interests, on the other hand, are based
merely upon desires or preferences, and therefore have no claim to recognition beyond the fact of their incorporation into positive law. Additionally,
argumetits for incorporating interests into positive law may legitimately be
made merely on the basis of their benefit to the proponents or others. Given
such a framework for analysis, it is hardly surprising that even the legal
positivist will conclude that in legal analysis, rights should always "trump"
interests. This assertion stands at the foundation of liberal constitutional
41
thought.
Although the principle that a right always prevails against an interest is
significant, it is also quite limited. It does not, of course, aid us in properly
classifying claims as one or the other. Without extensive further elaboration,
this principle provides no basis for resolving disputes in which a right is sef
against another right. 42 Just as obvious, though less remarked upon, is the
fact that the rights-interests duality conveys the message that all interests,
all "non-rights," are also of equal dignity. The law, as opposed to politics,
has no reason to favor one over another, except as instructed to do so by
the political branches of government. Finally, the bifurcation of legal claims

39. See Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).

40. For a discussion of these various elements, see several of the essays in NOMOS XXIII:
HUMAN RiGHTS (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1951) [hereinafter HUMAN RiGHTS].
41. Perhaps the most prominent example of this fact is the influential work of the selfdescribed liberal thinker Ronald Dworkin. See R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RiGnS SERIOUSLY (1978).
42. This will commonly be characterized as a "balancing test." But balancing tests can
provide so little guidance as to how to proceed and what type of weight to assign to various
interests that they justify the cynicism which they attract, not only from critics who doubt the

value of the entire enterprise of liberal rights theory, but from the mainstream of American

law. Justice Rehnquist, in dissenting from the Court's application of the balancing test to assess

the validity of state regulation of interstate commerce, stated that the test, as applied by the
Court, meant that "the only state truck-length limit 'that is valid is one which this Court has

not been able to get its hands on.'

"

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,

687 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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into rights and interests leads us to downplay the connections between the
two, connections which should be readily conceded even by those most intent
on maintaining both as separate categories.
The first connection between the two types of claims has already been
noted. When an interest is incorporated, through valid procedures, into
positive law, that interest is entitled to the status of a legal right, at least
to the extent that it does not conflict with a claim of right based upon
considerations more worthy of respect than positive law. 43 Indeed, classic
legal positivism would make enactment of a claim at least a necessary, if
not a sufficient, condition for recognizing a right to that claim." While
natural law or natural rights theory would not consider positive recognition
as essential to the existence of a right, it clearly does not view such recognition
as unimportant. Except at their most abstract, natural rights theorists are
largely engaged in urging those with positive lawmaking power to recognize
and protect natural rights through positive enactments.
To a legal positivist then, because rights depend on formal recognition,
the most important right of all might be described as the right to participate
in the process of enacting claims into law and thereby transforming them
from mere interests into rights. Without such a right all of the individual's
other rights are merely matters of grace from the lawmaker. With such a
right, however, the individual may actively participate not only in securing
present rights, but also in obtaining rights not yet recognized as such. Thus
the right to participate in lawmaking, the process which creates rights, is of
central importance.
The natural rights theorist will not go so far. In theory, participation in
the making of positive law will be seen as less important than it is to the
legal positivist, since the lawmaker is limited by the demands of natural law
or the existence of natural rights. But in practice, the ability to participate
in bringing about recognition of natural rights must be of great importance
to the natural rights theorist who wishes to live in a just society. While the
ability to so participate may not here be described as the most important
right, it clearly is of great importance, and can readily be seen to be one
of the natural rights of the citizen.
Anglo-American thought concerning human rights almost invariably starts
with a consideration of the needs of the autonomous individual. 45 This has

43. Thus, even the critic of positivism will readily concede that often the existence of a
statute is itself sufficient to establish a right or duty, "that statutes have the general power to
create and extinguish legal rights . . . ." R. DwomN, supra note 41, at 105-06.
44. To H.L.A. Hart, the most prominent modern positivist, a command achieves the status
of law when it is enacted pursuant to some accepted "rule of recognition," a rule which
governs how rules are made. See H.L.A. HART, Tim CONCEPT OF LAW 97-120 (1961).
45. See generally HUmAN RicHTs, supra note 40 (a collection of papers prepared for the
American Section of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social
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led, quite naturally, to a tendency to regard a right as something which can,
or at least should, be brought into existence solely through the exercise of

individual will. Activities undertaken in community with others, activities
which depend for their eventual success upon agreement and participation
by others, tend to be listed on the "non-rights" side of the ledger by those
accustomed to dividing claims into rights and non-rights. Yet the autonomous

individual does not exist, and apart from fiction and philosophical theory,
never has. Humanity is exercised only in some form of community. It is
strange to begin discussion of human rights with the autonomous individual
not only because of the artificiality of such a person, but also because
without the need to relate to others the need to discuss the question of rights
simply does not exist. Perhaps an even more intriguing question than whether
a falling tree makes a noise even if it is unheard is whether anyone can have
a right without someone else present to put forward a claim denying or
limiting it.
If some sort of community is necessary not only for human existence but
also for the meaningful existence of a right, then the discussion of rights
requires discussion of government institutions as much as it requires discussion of the nature of the individual. Commentators have recognized this
fact, but often in a very limited way. Rights in the American system are
seen as primarily, if not exclusively, negative rights-that is, the right to be
protected from government action.4 The existence of affirmative rights,
rights to compel government to provide benefits, is much more controversial.

However, this common distinction misses the way in which negative rights
are similar to affirmative rights. Negative rights negate the power of the

political branches of government, but they are affirmative with respect to
the judiciary. When the criminal defendant asserts a negative right against

Philosophy). William Winslade argues that human rights grow out of "vital human needs."
Id. at 24-37. W.T. Blackstone defines "human rights," and distinguishes them from "legal
rights," by stating that they arise from the individual's status as a human being, and are "not
contingent upon membership in a legal political community." Id. at 90. This type of reasoning
is shared, it seems, by positivists. Hart has written that the basis of all liberal rights talk is
"that all men have an equal right to be free." Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights, Pin.
REv., Apr. 1955, at 175, 176. And this is not limited to Anglo-American sources. Otto Gierke
has written that:
[t]he fixed first principle of the natural-law theory of society continued to be the
priority of the Individual to the Group-a priority all the more readily assumed
because the state of society was universally held to be derived from a previous
state of nature, in which it was supposed that no real group had existed....
Men were originally free and equal, and therefore independent and isolated in
their relation to one another.
0. GERacE, NATURAL LAW AN

TnE THEoRY OF Socmry 96 (E. Barker trans. ed. 1958).

46. This proposition nevertheless has been challenged at times. See, e.g., Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to EssentialGovernment
Services, 90 HAzv. L. Rav. 1065 (1977).
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the activity of the prosecutor, he does so by calling for action by the courts;
he asserts an affirmative right to court action.
When we deny the existence of affirmative rights, we cannot be maintaining
that there is no right to compel government activity, but only a right to
prevent it, since the enforcement of negative rights is itself government action
which can clearly be compelled. When an affirmative right is denied, what
is actually being determined is that in this case, an individual does not have
the right to compel government activity by his own demand. We typically
use the word "right," then, to speak of a government action which can be
compelled by an individual. Outcomes which depend on the agreement of
others are non-rights.
Under such a system, rights invariably will be associated with the functions
of the judicial branch, non-rights with the political branches. However, this
masks the extent to which the functions of the political branches also involve
rights, even in the strong sense of the word, as individual claims which must
be recognized. When a claim of right is made, the typical claimant is actually
saying three closely related, but distinct, things. Let us take as an example
a criminal defendant accused of violating a statute which he claims is unconstitutional. First, and most obviously, the defendant claims to be entitled
to a particular outcome-that is, a favorable judgment. But he is also
claiming two other things. Our defendant claims the right to make his claim
before the proper government body, and also claims the right to have his
claim, if upheld, effectively enforced. If either of these latter conditions do
not apply, recognition of the initial claim is worthless.
Marbury v. Madison47 can be seen as the most prominent recognition that
the typical claim of right is actually a claim of three closely related rights:
the right to a particular outcome, the right to seek that outcome, and the
right to have the outcome effectively carried out. While Chief Justice Marshall's opinion denied that Marbury had the right to seek his claimed relief
in the particular forum he chose, the opinion is, on the whole, a forceful
affirmation of the need to protect the less obvious parts of the constitutional
litigant's claim, that is, the right to be heard and the right to have the proper
48
outcome carried into effect.
A claimant before the political branches is obviously making a far different
type of claim. No individual can assert the right to a particular outcome
before the legislature. Legislative outcomes are the product of the aggregated
claims of an effective majority. But to focus on this difference is to ignore

47. 5 U.s. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. Prior to holding that Marbury had sought an inappropriate remedy, the Court quotes
Blackstone: "[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is
also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." Id. at 163. The
most sweeping statement that the political branches are constitutionally bound to implement
court rulings was set forth in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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the similarities between the claimant before the courts and the claimant
before the legislature. Each of them makes two claims that the constitutional
system does recognize: the right to press the claim and the right to have the
substantive claim, if recognized, effectively implemented. These latter claims
are just as properly designated rights as is the claim made by the litigant
(but not by the participant in the political process) to a particular outcome
regardless of the agreement of others making claims before the court.
Most constitutional scholarship has dealt explicitly with claims of rights
to particular outcomes. These rights are often found to exist in litigation,
but almost never found to exist in the political process.4 9 The right of litigants
to have access to a court and to have a favorable decision enforced have
been clearly recognized, at least since Marbury. The last two decades have
seen a major increase in awareness of the importance of access to the political
system. Constitutional scholars, most prominently John Hart Ely, have recognized the central importance of participation in the legislative process to
the constitutional system. While the Constitution does not mandate particular
legislative outcomes (except in the sense that some are forbidden), it does
mandate, through the equal protection clause and other provisions, that the
process of legislation be open to all citizens.50 Thus, the right to participate
in the process has been clearly recognized to be, in all respects, a right. Ely,
in fact, goes so far as to contend that it is the central right which should
guide interpretation of the scope of all of the open-ended rights provisions
which are at the heart of the most controversial constitutional disputes of
recent years. 5'
Thus, a right to participate in the legislative process, apart from the right
to obtain a particular outcome, has been recognized. It has not yet been
widely recognized, however, that the third part of a possible rights claim,
the right to effective implementation of rights acknowledged by the government, is also properly thought of as a right. It is somewhat surprising, given
the uncontroversial nature of the assertion that a litigant is entitled to
effective implementation of a favorable court decision, that it is not more
explicitly recognized that the citizen who prevails in the legislative process
has a similar right. However, given the nature of rights analysis with its

49. Nevertheless, some rights to positive legislative outcomes are recognized, at least in
general terms, in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, contained
in Part A of Res. 217 (III) of the General Assembly, enacted Dec. 10, 1948 (recognizing rights
to adequate standard of living, free education, reasonable limitation of working hours and
others). See U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Some state constitutions also require that government must
provide certain services to its people. See Langdon & Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking
for the Right to Shelter, 19 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 332-35 (1985).
50. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
51. See J. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DsTusT (1980).
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foundation in the autonomous individual, it is not altogether unexpected
that this should be true.
The right of access to the political process is similar to the right of a
litigant before a court. It owes its existence, quite obviously, to the claim
of a single individual to its recognition. But implementation of positive rights
enacted by the legislature depends, of course, on the activity of that body
and ultimately, upon an effective majority of the community. We are reluctant to assign the term "right" to something which owes its existence to
the majority. But if we fail to do so, we seriously undermine the recognized
right of the individual to participate in the political process, a right which
might be redefined as the right to participate in the process of determining
which substantive rights will be created, or recognized, by positive law.
Liberty is most often thought of as closely akin to privacy, or "the fight
to be left alone.''52 But freedom from interference by others is rarely an
end in itself. Rather, it is a condition conducive and possibly necessary to
the accomplishment of some other goal. The negative right of liberty is
linked to a desire to act in some positive way to fulfill goals. Even if possible
altruistic goals are put aside, self-fulfillment will often be possible only with
the assistance of government. Without the organized efforts of others, the
individual may be powerless to remove obstacles posed by other individuals,
or by impersonal forces such as ignorance or dire poverty, which prevent
advancement of his concept of a satisfying life.
The proper functioning of the political branches, with their "active virtues," 53 is not something separate and distinct from individual rights. The
proposition that each branch of government, as long as it is acting within
its constitutional powers, may act effectively should not be seen merely as
a "right" belonging to that institution, but as a necessary principle to make
meaningful the right of the citizen to participate in government. While it
seems clear that, aside from labelling certain legislative choices as impermissible, the Constitution does not guarantee any particular legislative outcomes, the effective functioning of the process by which discretionary legislative
choices are made is itself of a higher order than any particular outcome.
Since the right to participate in the decisions of the political branches is
worth little if properly enacted statutes are not carried into effect, it must
follow that the citizen has some kind of right that majoritarian decisions
not be interfered with unless they violate some other constitutional right.
Although government itself will act to assert this right, it does so on behalf
of the citizen, the actual holder of the right.

52. The right to privacy has been called "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
53. Contrast these attributes to the "passive virtues" of courts praised in A. BicKEB, supra
note 31.
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The use of the terminology of rights here may be initially troubling. We
are accustomed to "balancing" rights when they appear to conflict, with
sometimes one, sometimes the other of the conflicting rights prevailing. Will
recognition of a right to effective implementation of majoritarian outcomes
pose a serious threat to the preservation of traditionally recognized rights
of the individual to be free of majoritarian constraints? This need not be
so if the right to enforcement of majoritarian outcomes is seen as a right
of a distinct kind. The distinction can be drawn by the use of a distinctive
term; this right may be designated as a "background right."
A background right relates not to any particular substantive outcome
produced by the system, but rather to the proper functioning of the system
itself. It is a right in the sense that it is of greater constitutional weight than
any particular statutory enactment. Nevertheless, it remains "in the background" and is of less constitutional weight than the specific limits placed
on the substantive outcomes of the legislative process by the antimajoritarian
individual rights provisions of the Constitution. This leaves no room for
balancing an antimajoritarian right against background rights; once the
former is established it will always prevail. To this extent, a background
right has no greater weight than an interest under a traditional, bipolar,
"rights-interests" analysis.5 4 But the background right demands respect where
it is not countered by an exception in the form of an antimajoritarian right.
This should be recognized as a central constitutional principle. Citizens have
a right, not merely an interest, to their majoritarian choices insofar as those
choices have been properly enacted into law and are not inconsistent with
other constitutional guarantees.
The designation of effective functioning of the political branches as "rights"
of any kind will still seem strange, in light of the fact that rights, at least
in American constitutional thought, are seen as claims against the government. In what sense is the claim of a background right such a claim? Is it
not, rather, a claim by the government to an extension of power? Clearly,
claims of antimajoritarian rights are enforced against government. But they
are specifically enforced against the political branches of government. The
act of enforcing these rights is also a claim to an extension of power by a

branch of government, that is, the judiciary. Thus, the traditional rights
claim is not simply a matter of an individual standing against the state, but

rather involves the individual calling upon one arm of the state to exercise,
on his behalf, its power to override another arm of the state. Still, we have
no great difficulty recognizing this as the exercise of an individual's right.

54. Ronald Dworkin denies that the term "right" can be applied in the same sense to both
the individual's claims against the government and a citizen's "right to have the laws of the
nation enforced," since this would lead to pervasive balancing which would make the individual's
right largely worthless. R. DwopsuN, supra note 41, at 194. No doubt the right to the enforcement of statutes is of a different nature than antimajoritarian rights.
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In the same way, the demand for recognition of a background right
involves a claim that one arm of the state legitimately may stay the power
of another arm. But here the roles of the branches of government are
reversed, which makes the claim seem strange. Antimajoritarian rights are
secured through the activity of courts, and the deference of the political
branches. Background rights to a democratic system are secured by the
deference of courts to those same political branches. Neither case is a pure
example of a person or group of people standing against a unitary entity
known as the state. On the contrary, each exemplifies the proper use of
part of the machinery of the state to assure protection for the rights of the
people involved against attempts by other parts of the state to frustrate
those rights.
The key difference between traditional antimajoritarian rights and the
background right of the people to enforcement of properly enacted democratic outcomes lies in the different roles assumed by the different branches
of government in each case. Where an antimajoritarian right exists, the
courts have the duty to respond to the claim of an aggrieved individual,
and it is generally accepted that the political branches have the duty to
respect the court's decision. 5 Where no restraint on the majority exists, the
political branches have the duty to be responsive to the claims of the majority
for legislative action. And the accompanying duty of the courts, in such a
case, is to defer to the legislature. This deference should not be seen as a
matter of discretion, but rather as a duty, imposed by the Constitution
through its grant to the people of the background right to properly enacted,
constitutional, democratic outcomes. 56 Such a duty is just as compelling as
the duty of the political branches to respect the proper exercise of judicial
power. In either case, failure to respect the other branch does not merely
injure the institution of the state, it interferes with the rights of people. This
is well recognized in the case of the "negative" rights of the individual to
be free of unconstitutional restraints. It should be equally well recognized
in the case of the "positive" rights of the people to choose whatever constitutional government outcomes they prefer.
Once we recognize the effective implementation of properly enacted and
constitutional democratic outcomes as a right belonging to the citizens who
supported that outcome, rather than simply an interest of the state as distinct
from its citizens, the importance of uniform interpretation of federal constitutional provisions becomes clear. If people have a right to the preservation

55. This has not always been a universally held view. See G. GuNTHER, CoNsirruToiNAL
LAw 21-26 (1lth ed. 1985). However, it is now certainly held by the Supreme Court itself. See
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
56. The duty, pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution, referred to by John Marshall in
Marbury is to "administer justice" in conformance not only with "the constitution," but also,
of course, with the "law of the United States." Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 180.
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of proper majoritarian outcomes (just as they have the right to the invalidation of unconstitutional majoritarian outcomes), then unjustified expansion of antimajoritarian rights provisions is not, as Justice Stevens sees it
in his dissent in Long,5 7 a harmless error which threatens no legitimate
federal interest.
The flaw in Stevens' analogy of the relationship between federal and state
courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between courts of different
nations, on the other, is obvious. It is correct to say that if the courts of
Finland should free a United States citizen based upon an overly expansive
reading of an individual rights provision of the United States Constitution,
our courts would have no legitimate interest in overturning the decision, and
seeing to it that the American suffer the appropriate consequences of his
illegal activity in Finland. But that is true primarily because the United States
Supreme Court has no duties which run to the people of Finland; specifically,
no duty to see to it that properly adopted Finnish legislative choices are
upheld.
This situation is not properly analogized to the case of a state court, or
lower federal court, releasing such a defendant based upon a similar expansion of a claimed constitutional right. In such a case, failure to reverse the
incorrect decision interferes with the background rights of United States
citizens to effective implementation of constitutional legislative choices. In
reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court is not acting to elevate nonrights over rights, or even to elevate its institutional claims over those of
state courts, but rather to elevate the rights of the people over an invalid
claim of an individual right. Here, unlike the hypothetical case involving
the courts of Finland, the Supreme Court does have a relationship and a
duty to the citizens whose legislative choices are frustrated by the incorrect
judicial application of the Constitution.
This argument does not necessarily mean that uniformity must always
prevail. It does not seem, for example, essentially inconsistent with the core
of Professor Sager's critique of the Supreme Court's eagerness to police
lower court "overenforcement" of individual rights. Professor Sager's basic
position is that there is no need to police "overly generous interpretations
of federal constitutional values" except where "competing constitutional
concerns are at stake." 58 As noted above, Professor Sager believes that there
are no such competing concerns when the state or lower federal court has
rejected "institutional" rather than "analytical" reasons for limiting the
scope of an individual right. Institutional reasons are practical, and distinct
from the conclusion that analysis of the right claimed indicates that it should
not extend to the case at issue. This bifurcation of reasons for denying

57. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
58. Sager, supra note 30, at 1249.
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constitutional claims allows Professor Sager, unlike Justice Stevens, to see,
for example, Supreme Court decisions restraining the scope of rights of
criminal suspects as generally being analytical, and therefore not properly
59
the subject for more expansive state court treatment.
Thus, Professor Sager's position does not appear inconsistent with the
existence of the citizen's background right to effective enforcement of constitutional legislation. If the Supreme Court has refused to act for purely
"institutional" reasons when confronted with a claim of constitutional rights,
then the challenged legislation or practice may well be unconstitutional. As
we have seen, the citizens' background right extends only to the implementation of constitutional legislation. In such a case, if uniformity is called
for at all, it cannot be due to the obligation to respect background rights.
However, failure to recognize the existence of the background right is significant because in its absence, the tendency of courts, accustomed to bipolar
rights-interests thinking, may well be to lean unduly toward characterizing
contrary Supreme Court precedents as being "institutional" decisions. After
all, such an incorrect characterization will offend only majoritarian interests,
rather than anyone's right. The explicit recognition of the background right
to effective implementation of constitutional legislation as a possible "competing constitutional concern" should lead state and lower federal courts to
be very cautious in finding that Supreme Court limitations on individual
rights are based solely upon institutional reasons. Background rights do not
negate the possibility of rare instances of "underenforcement" which may
be expanded upon by state and lower federal courts, but they do call for
great care in the invocation of such a theory.60
The structure of the Constitution clearly indicates that despite substantive
limitations and procedural hurdles, the people have, in general, the right to
choose to promote the welfare of their community through proper legislation,
and through the election of responsive executive officers. When properly
enacted, constitutional legislation is not implemented because of court intervention, the damage is not simply to an abstraction called "the state."
In such a case, the right of the citizen to effectively govern himself and his
community, a right which remains in the background of the constitutional
system, is infringed. This background right provides a solid explanation of
the importance of uniformity in the interpretation of federal constitutional
rights. But the general elevation of majoritarian outcomes above the status

59. Id. at 1244-45 n.104.
60. However, such cases would be limited to those in which the Supreme Court has clearly
acted for procedural reasons such as lack of standing, mootness or a finding that the case is
not ripe. This is not the type of underenforcement at the heart of Professor Sager's article.
The theory would not affect his contention that Congress may, through its constitutional powers
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, expand the protections of the substantive provisions of that amendment. See id. at 1228-42.
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of mere "interests" in rights-interests analysis will, no doubt, spark objections. At the same time, the concept of such a background right has implications beyond the narrow issue of uniformity. This Article will now
briefly address each of these points.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF A BACKGROUND RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

No doubt, there will be some serious reluctance to label as a "right" any
principle which calls for respect, rather than invalidation, of democratic
outcomes. Any blurring of the distinction between individual rights and
majoritarian interests, it may be contended, will most likely lead to undue
restriction of important antimajoritarian rights. Every inquiry into the scope
of an individual right will now become a balancing test pitting the individual
right against a competing background right, and the important principle that
rights invariably trump interests will be lost.
Such an outcome is possible, but only through misuse of the background
rights concept put forward here. This misuse might arise out of misunderstanding or out of simple hostility to broadly defined antimajoritarian rights.
Those who hold the latter view already have a broad range of arguments
at their disposal. There is little that can be done about an advocate's likely
misuse of a concept for his own ends. But misuse through misunderstanding
can be avoided by clear restatement of the principle that background rights
are not conceptually the same as antimajoritarian rights. They are not to
be balanced against antimajoritarian rights in a court's analysis of the meaning of those rights provisions of the Constitution. The principle of background rights comes into play only after a court has determined that the
legislative or administrative act in question is constitutional; it is not properly
a part of the assessment of the question of constitutionality itself. Thus, the
principle of background rights gives the citizen the right to the enforcement
of constitutional majoritarian outcomes, not the right to the enforcement
61
of all majoritarian outcomes.
Although the concept of a background right to effective democratic processes cannot be invoked to limit explicit constitutional provisions meant to
serve as antimajoritarian checks upon that principle, it may be of great
assistance in interpreting other constitutional provisions. Much of the Constitution deals with the distribution of legislative power between the states
and the federal government, the balance of policy making power between
the executive and legislative branches, and other structural questions. Several

61. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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of these structural issues, such as the scope of the tenth amendment 62 and
the constitutionality of the "legislative veto"63 have been matters of sharp
dispute in recent years. Unlike most of the antimajoritarian individual rights
provisions of the Constitution,' 4 structural provisions are often best viewed
as means rather than ends in themselves. Interpretation of those provisions
should take into account the principle of a background right. Structures are
not ends in themselves, but exist to protect someone's rights. If the practice
in question does not violate an individual's antimajoritarian rights, then
structural questions should be decided to favor the background right of
effective democratic processes, rather than to serve some abstract concept
such as "states' rights" without a showing of how such a concept protects
65
individual rights in the political arena.
In addition to illuminating interpretation of structural provisions, the
concept of a background right to effective democratic outcomes may be of
significance in helping define the scope of individual rights not explicit in
the text of the Constitution. Far from being a threat to antimajoritarian
rights, the concept could provide a firm basis for the recognition of additional
rights. The most hotly contested question of constitutional interpretation in
recent years has been whether such nontextual rights exist, and if so, just

62. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. After decades of lying dormant, the provision has been
the subject of renewed interest and dispute. See National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (striking down, for the first time in modern constitutional history, a federal statute
pursuant to the amendment), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
63. The once commonly used device by which Congress would delegate decision making
power to the executive branch, but retain the right to overrule decisions made in a particular
case, by the vote of one or both houses. The device was ruled unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
64. Some Bill of Rights guarantees are clearly valued as ends in themselves. Freedom of
religion, for example, or the third amendment provision against quartering soldiers in private
homes in peacetime, need no explanation for why they are seen as good things in themselves.
The first amendment freedom of speech has long been the subject of debate between those
who see it as an end in itself, and those who see it as a means of securing an underlying right
to participate in political debate and activity. See M. NIMalME,NRhM:ER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
ch. 1 (1984). Finally, the Constitution protects some things, such as firearms, clearly for their
value as means to secure other ends rather than as ends in themselves. See Beschle, Reconsidering
the Second Amendment: ConstitutionalProtectionfor a Right of Security, 9 HAMMnE L. REV.
69 (1986).
65. If a "state's right" is seen as ultimately belonging to the government entity itself, it
will command little respect in a system of rights based upon the individual. But if it is seen
as merely a necessary concept for effectuating individual rights, it must be treated more
respectfully. In criticizing the concept of absolute rights, Alejo DeCervera has pointed out the
importance of effective groups (including the state) to individuals: "the individual needs groups;
he needs them so badly that without them he could do literally nothing but succumb ...
without groups the individual would be literally powerless .... DeCervera, Natural Law
Restated: An Analysis of Liberty in HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 55, 58.
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what they are. 6 Although "interpretivists," those who generally reject the
recognition of antimajoritarian rights not explicitly set forth in the document, 67 have recently gained political power and are well represented in
academe,6 9 their position is seriously undermined by provisions of the Constitution itself which seem intentionally drawn to invite expansion over time.
Perhaps most prominent among these constitutional provisions is the ninth
amendment.70 If that provision does not mean that there are, or at least
may be, some rights beyond those explicit in the constitutional text, it is
difficult to imagine what meaning it does have.
Despite the existence of the ninth amendment and other open-ended constitutional provisions, 7' opposition to expand individual antimajoritarian rights
is not only strong, but quite understandable. Since the Constitution itself
provides no method for deciding what new rights are to be recognized,
almost any suggested expansion can be attacked as an illegitimate use of
judicial power. Some interpretive guidelines must be found, and while the
open-ended provisions themselves provide none, that is not to say that there
are none present in the Constitution as a whole.
The most prominent theory drawing on overall constitutional themes to
interpret open-ended rights provisions 72 is that of John Hart Ely.73 Professor
Ely, recognizing the central importance of participation in the political proc-

66. See, e.g., Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383 (1985); Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YAL L.J. 1063 (1981); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
67. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOvERMENT BY JuDIcIARY (1977); Bork, supra note 66.
68. The Reagan administration has clearly articulated its commitment to this "interpretivist"
school of thought, specifically to "a jurisprudence of original intention." Meese, The Supreme
Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEx. L.J. 455, 466 n.60
(1986).
69. The Reagan administration has chosen former academics not only for three of the last
four recent Supreme Court nominations, but also for several prominent court of appeals
positions. See Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with
the Views of Five Conservative, Academic Judges, 50 U. ML.ff L. REv. 913 (1986).
70. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
71. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive ball shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.").
72. Some scholars explicitly defend a jurisprudence which does not purport to interpret,
but rather moves beyond, the text to permit implementation of a higher law through constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUION, Tma CoUITs AND HUMAN Riirs:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGrrimAcY OF CONSTrrToNAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982);
Grey, supra note 66. However, some reject Professor Ely's contention that he is merely
interpreting the text as a whole. Judge Bork, for example, calls Ely "a non-interpretivist whether
he knows it or not." Bork, supra note 66, at 390.
73. J. ELY, supra note 51. Professor Ely's work has been the source of widespread comment,
favorable and otherwise. See, e.g., Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OIo
ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
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ess to the constitutional system, maintains that open-ended rights provisions
should be interpreted in a "representation reinforcing" way, that is, in light
of the constitutional vision of equal participation of citizens in the representative processes of government. 74 Thus, decisions of majorities which
systematically harm discrete groups who are disadvantaged in the political
process, 75 or which serve to skew the process itself to distort democratic
outcomes, should be reversed, despite the lack of explicit constitutional
language prohibiting such legislation. But where the representative process
is not distorted in such a way, its results should be respected by courts,
76
unless an explicit constitutional right is impaired.
Professor Ely's conclusions are largely consistent with the proposition that
the Constitution creates a background right to effective implementation of
constitutional results of the democratic process. In fact, his contention that
courts must use open-ended rights provisions to assure equal access to the
political process and meaningful opportunities for participation is absolutely
essential to any defensible constitutional theory which rests upon the central
77
importance of democracy.
Professor Ely, however, may be too quick to dismiss the possibility that
the constitutional bias toward representational government may, in limited
cases, call for the expansion of antimajoritarian rights unrelated to process.
It might be said that the continued existence of a statute or practice which
has come to be clearly inconsistent with the firmly established basic values
of a clear majority of the community, is not an affirmation, but rather a
rejection, of the concept of democratic decisionmaking. While such cases
will be rare, where the community has been unable to enact its will on a
particular subject, invalidation of the statute will be justified on majoritarian
grounds.
As discussed above, the typical claim of a constitutional right before a
court is actually a package of three claims, so intimately integrated that they
are thought of as one: the claim to a particular outcome, regardless of the
opinion of others; the claim to a forum to present the first claim; and the
claim to effective implementation of a favorable decision. When the citizen

74. J. ELY, supra note 51, at 181.
75. Id. at 135-79. "The whole point of the approach is to identify those groups in society
to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attending .... Id.
at 151. In addition, the approach should prohibit classifications aimed at "groups we know
others (specifically those who control the legislative process) might wish to injure ...." Id.
at 151, 153.
76. Newly fashioned, substantive individual rights should be avoided, except upon a showing
that "representative government cannot be trusted." Id. at 183. Thus, both Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), must be rejected. See Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf.A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
77. Ely would use the open-ended rights provisions of the Constitution to assure that the
channels of the political process are not blocked by entrenched officials. J. ELY, supra note
51, at 105-34.
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makes a claim to the legislature, while he has no right to the outcome he
seeks apart from the agreement of others, he does have a right to the latter
two claims: the ability to participate effectively in the process, and the right
to have constitutional majoritarian decisions effectively implemented. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the existence of a piece of legislation will
be indisputable evidence that it reflects the will of the majority. There may,
however, be exceptions.
Professor William Nelson has explored the history of the concept of
judicial review and has noted a distinct shift in the common understanding
7
of its natureY.
While the power of judicial review has been seen as distinctly
antimajoritarian since the Civil War (and accepted as properly so), during
the early years of the republic a somewhat different view was common.
People perceived courts as necessary to strike down legislative outcomes
when the legislature had failed to represent the true interests of the people,
when it had acted in a corrupt or merely venal way contrary to the principles
of true civic virtue, 79 and where the legislature had furthered powerful, special
interests rather than those of the people. 0 Under such a standard, judicial
review can be seen as quite democratic after all.
Of course, this view of judicial review does not render illegitimate the
subsequent use of the power to act on behalf of individuals if one defines
civic virtue to include the respect for individual rights mandated by the
Constitution. Even a properly representative majority of legislators might
well betray the will of the people, defined to include not only those currently
of voting age, but also those who have come before and whose "votes" on
the question of government power were recorded in the Constitution."1 Professor Nelson's findings, therefore, do not require us to decide that either
the early conception of judicial review or its modern status as a shield against

78. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional
Theory in the States 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972).
79. Prior to 1820:
[tlhe concern of judges in early constitutional cases was with the potentiality of
conflict between legislators and their constituents-with the possibility that faithless legislators might betray the trust placed in them by the people. The perceived
purpose of judicial review was to protect the people from such possible betrayals,
not to interpose obstacles in the path of decisions made by the people's agents
in due execution of their trust.
Id. at 1177.
80. Only after 1820, when the electoral system became more democratic, and it became
harder to contend that the system had betrayed the people's wishes, was judicial review
commonly exercised "in order to further political, social, or economic doctrines ... which the
people had rejected in the more democratic legislative process." Id. at 1181.
81. Bickel's prescription that judges "immerse themselves in the tradition of our society
and of kindred societies that have gone before . . . ," A. BicEmL, supra note 31, at 236, can
be seen as antidemocratic if the only relevant community is the one currently alive. That is
not the case, however, if the relevant community is expanded to include those who have come
before.
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majorities is illegitimate. They do, however, call to our attention the fact
that the actions of courts, even in deciding to strike down legislation, were
not seen in the framers' time as being unrelated to the proper function of
democratic processes.
The connection between Professor Nelson's view of judicial review and
the theories of Professor Ely involving the "representation reinforcing"
function of the courts is clear. The connection suggests that Professor Ely's
concern with process should be supplemented with some mechanism by which
courts, in exceptional cases, might expand substantive individual rights, but
do so in a way which is basically deferential, rather than hostile, to the will
of the people. The theory of constitutional interpretation put forward by
Professor Harry Wellington seems well-adapted to this end. 2
Professor Wellington does not want to limit courts only to those rights
explicitly recognized in the Constitution as understood in 1787.83 However,
at the same time, he sees no justification for judges who impose their own
moral code upon the public.8 4 He resolves this dilemma by contending that
courts may read moral principles into the Constitution, but should do so in
a way which reflects "conventional morality," that is, the morality of the
community, rather than that of the judges themselves.85 Professor Wellington's arguments have been widely criticized. To conservatives, his rejection
of pure "interpretation '8 6 is illegitimate. 7 To many liberals, his method of
expanding explicit textual rights is unacceptable because of its reliance on
public sentiment. 8 Both lines of argument, particularly the latter, seem to
rest largely on the commonly accepted notion that rights are one thing, that
majority views are another, and that the two are very dissimilar.
Recognizing the citizen's background right to effective democratic processes may serve to bridge this gap. If the citizen has a right and not merely
an interest that the legislature act in response to the sentiments shared by
the citizen and the majority of the community (consistent with antimajoritarian constitutional rights), then "conventional morality" becomes more
than morality as that term is commonly understood. It becomes a proper

82. Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 290-95 (1973).
83. Professor Wellington, for example, supports the outcome in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). Id. at 285-95.
84. In his discussion of Griswold, Professor Wellington states that "conventional morality,
rather than the morality of some wise philosopher, is the test." Id. at 293.
85. Id. at 243-49.
86. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
87. The criticism generally rests on the grounds that courts simply are in no better position
than legislators to discern the basic principles to which the people adhere. See, e.g., Bork,
supra note 66, at 389-90.
88. See, e.g., L. TRrNE, AME uCAN CONSTITUoNAL
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15-3, at 896 (1978); Richards,

Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights
and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 977 (1979).
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measure for courts to use in assessing the extent to which legislation is
properly responsive to the citizen's right to effective self-governance.
In his highly acclaimed book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,8 9
Professor Guido Calabresi describes the ways in which statutes, which were
once functional and reflective of the public will, can eventually lose both
of these attributes and yet remain in force. 9° He advocates recognizing that
in such cases, courts should declare the statute in question invalid, just as
they might overrule an outdated doctrine of common law. 9' This invalidation
would not, however, be a declaration of unconstitutionality, but merely a
statement that the court finds the law no longer serves its once proper
purposes. Thus, if the court was wrong in its estimation of public will, the
legislature could re-enact the law, as it could in the case of any statute which
has lapsed or has been repealed. Of course, this option is unavailable where
the statute has been declared inconsistent with the Constitution. 92 Professor
Calabresi contends that explicit recognition of this judicial power would
reduce the temptation of courts to strike down outmoded statutes on dubious
constitutional grounds since the sole alternative would no longer be to sustain
a highly unpalatable enactment. 93 Still, Professor Calabresi would urge courts
to use this new power with caution and to take great pains to be reasonably
sure that a statute no longer represents the will of the community before
invalidating it. 94
The relationship between Professor Wellington's thought and that of Professor Calabresi is evident. Professor Calabresi explicitly states that he is
not putting forward a theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather a
redefinition of the power of common law courts appropriate to contemporary
legal reality.95 Still, the constitutional overtones of his proposal are clear.
Courts would obtain new powers of "judicial review," though perhaps a
96
less powerful form than that of Marbury v. Madison.

89. G.

CAL"RtEsI,

A COMMON LAW

FOR T=E AGE OF STATUTES (1982).

90. Professor Calabresi wrote:

[Blecause a statute is hard to revise once it is passed, laws are governing us that

would not and could not be enacted today, and ... some of these laws not only
could not be reenacted but also do not fit, are in some sense inconsistent with,
our whole legal landscape. The combination of lack of fit and lack of current
legislative support I will call the problem of legal obsolescence.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
91. "They can use this power either to make changes themselves or, by threatening to use
this power, to induce legislatures to act." Id. at 82.

92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 8-15.
Id.
Id. at 120-45.
Id. at 26-30.

96. Although these new powers of "judicial review" may be less powerful than those
developed in Marbury, they are likely to be exercised more frequently. John Marshall's reasoning
in Marbury (if not his actual decision) stressed that judicial review should be exercised only

when it was necessary in light of a clear conflict between the statute in question and the
Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
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There has been little, if any, movement to grant courts the powers that
Professor Calabresi advocates. Such a grant runs counter to widely accepted
theories concerning the relative roles of legislatures and courts in the lawmaking process. 97 But Professor Calabresi's analysis, despite his own disclaimers, might well be used to bolster Professor Wellington's constitutional
approach. Specifically, Professor Calabresi's analysis may apply to the question whether new substantive individual rights might be recognized as evolving out of open-ended constitutional provisions such as the due process
clause, the ninth amendment, and the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. It may be that the best way to interpret the
outer margins of some of these concepts will be to take the sentiment of
the community into account, but not by merely automatically affirming any
existing legislation.
At times, public sentiment has come clearly and consistently to regard
some sphere of private activity as protected against government intrusion,
but this attitude has not yet manifested itself in legislative action. When this
happens, it may be proper for courts to incorporate this well-accepted provision as one of those rights referred to in the ninth amendment, or as an
aspect of due process. 98 Thus, an active stance toward judicial review might
transcend its image as antidemocratic and become a force for correcting
failures of the political branches to respond to the people's sentiments.
Of course, recognizing this power to expand the list of individual antimajoritarian rights in a way consistent with what the people would have
legislated would require simultaneous insistence upon judicial caution in
exercising this power. An appraisal of the popular acceptance of further
restraints upon their own representatives' powers should be a genuine effort
to assess, and not merely a rhetorical disguise for a judge's vision of what
the people would or should prefer. Thus, Justice Marshall's articulation of
what he believes would be an enlightened public view of the constitutionality
of capital punishment" would not be a proper invocation of democratic

97. In light of possible separation of powers problems presented by his proposal, Calabresi
suggests that the legislature, by statute, delegate this power to the courts. G. CA.LABRsi, supra
note 89, at 114-16.
98. Similarly, a punishment once commonly seen as proportional to the crime might linger
well after most of society has rejected it as excessive. This may justify a broader judicial reading
of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Coker
v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
99. Concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Marshall concluded that
if the public were fully informed on the issue, "the average citizen would ... find [capital
punishment] shocking to his conscience and sense of justice. For this reason alone capital
punishment cannot stand." Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring). This view is clearly, however,
not what the public actually believes. Opinion polls consistently show support for the death
penalty in at least some cases. See Special Project-CapitalPunishment in 1984: Abandoning
the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CoRmLL L. REv. 1129, 1131-32 & n.8 (1984).
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values to expand individual rights. Popular sentiment, with all its defects,
must be taken as it stands.
The extension of an open-ended right, even when favored by a majority,
pursuant to the theory of judicial responsiveness to democratic sentiment
should not occur until the majority is clearly both substantial and not likely
to subside. Only when both conditions are present have the political branches
failed in their duty to be responsive to public sentiment. For example, it
can and has been maintained that by the early 1960's a durable consensus
had emerged to support the proposition that the use of birth control devices
by married couples was a matter beyond government control. 1' ° Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut'01 can be seen as
consistent with the people's right to effective democratic government. On
the other hand, although most Americans now seem to favor the right to
abortion (at least in some circumstances), it is clear that in 1973 the Supreme
Court could hardly have concluded that such a right had been clearly accepted
in positive law because of some
by the people, even though not recognized
02
failure of the democratic process.
The use of a test of long-standing substantial acceptance of a new right
as justification for recognizing it pursuant to the overall concept of the
people's right to effective democratic processes will, of course, rarely if ever
lead to invalidation of newly enacted legislation. Such an enactment will be
clear evidence, at the very least, of the absence of strong public sentiment
regarding it as unconstitutional. As Professor Calabresi envisions within his
common-law scheme, statutes which fall will be those once representative
of public sentiment, but which are now clearly rejected. 10 3 Once again, use
of this theory allows us to distinguish Griswoldfrom some other "substantive
due process" cases, notably Lochner v. New York, - in which freedom to
contract was recognized as a fundamental right. 01°
Griswold invalidated an old statute which had fallen into disuse' °6 and
which almost certainly would not have been reenacted at the time of the
100. See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 82, at 290-95.
101. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state prohibition of the use of contraceptives by married persons).
102. The response to Roe at the legislative level was a flurry of statutes attempting to salvage
as much deterrence of abortion as constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City, Missouri v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
103. G. CAi.Asi, supra note 89, at 2.
104. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
105. Lochner, which held unconstitutional a state's attempt to regulate the hours of workers,
was overruled in cases such as West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
106. The Connecticut anti-birth control statute had apparently been the basis for only one
prosecution from its enactment in 1879 to 1961, a policy which reflected public rejection of
the law at least as much as it did prosecutorial disinterest. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 501-02 (1961).
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decision. Although Griswold has been a fertile source of debate for legal
theorists, °7 the demise of the state's power to prohibit married couples from
using birth control has provoked no serious public opposition. In Lochner,
however, the Supreme Court struck down a newly enacted piece of legislation
to preserve its concept of freedom of contract. The Court was obviously
not reflecting the will of the people and in no sense can the Court be said
to have been correcting the failure of the legislature to be responsive to the
people's settled values. This rationale may be, aside from merely indicating
a personal preference for one set of natural fights over another, the only
persuasive way to maintain that current law is correct in its conclusion that
Lochner was wrongly decided, 10 8 but that Griswold was correct. 1' 9
The background right of the citizen to effective democratic processes,
then, has implications far beyond the narrow question of explaining the
importance of uniform interpretation of the Federal Constitution. It provides
further support for Professor Ely's emphasis on the function of the Constitution as a guarantor of equal participation in the political process." 0 But
it also suggests that Professor Ely's emphasis on process may be combined
with Professor Wellington's recognition that the legislative process may fall
to enact into positive law some of the comrnunity's firmly held beliefs. It
may, in such cases, be proper to recognize, through the ninth amendment
or some other open-ended constitutional provision, that the people have
determined to limit their own lawmaking powers in some way beyond the
limitations of 1787. As noted above, such decisions will rarely, if ever,
invalidate recent legislation. Furthermore, courts must take care to stay
within the confines of honestly assessing the firm, stable consensus of the
people, rather than becoming a platform for imposition of the judge's
feelings. Once again, it must be stressed that "conventional morality" cannot
serve as the basis for ignoring those antimajoritarian rights which are set
out in the constitutional text."' However, within these confines, use of the
concept of a background right to effective democratic processes might well
recapture the sense of judicial review as responsive to the true wishes of the
community which Professor Nelson finds in early nineteenth century deci-

107. See, e.g., Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. Ray. 1410 (1974); Kauper,

Penumbras,Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamentaland Things Forgotten:The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the
Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 173 (1979):
108. Wellington, supra note 82. Some recent literature has attempted to revive strong constitutional support for property rights. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EmINENT DoMAIN (1985). However, much of this literature is based upon

provisions such as the takings or contract clauses, rather than the due process clause.
109. The "right of privacy" enunciated in Griswold has been expanded to become one of

the most active areas of constitutional litigation. See L.
110. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.

111. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

TRIBE,

supra note 88, § 15-10.
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sions. 112 Ultimately, the power of courts to stand against majorities when
such an attitude is called for rests upon a sense that in the final analysis,
the work of courts will reflect the overall will of the community. That sense
can only be strengthened by judicial recognition that the citizen's rights are
not entirely limited to blocking government action.
This discussion of the overall impact of recognition of a background right
to effective democratic processes on constitutional interpretation is, of course,
not meant to be exhaustive. It is meant, rather, to comment briefly upon
the subject, to suggest how the concept relates to theories and conclusions
put forward by others, and to suggest further questions which recognition
of the concept will raise and the types of answers which might be provided.
The background right of effective democratic processes, which provides the
best justification for uniformity in the interpretation of federal constitutional
rights provisions, may also provide an important tool for other constitutional
inquiries.
CONCLUSION

The sharp division of legal claims into individual rights and majoritarian
interests has been helpful in the analysis of some constitutional questions,
but has obscured the real connections between these two concepts. Although
the individual rights which take the form of negations of government power
are, of course, of great importance, the Constitution as a whole also confers
upon the citizen the right to be an effective participant in shaping the
community through the enactment of positive law. Within the procedural
and substantive bounds set forth by the Constitution, the ability of the
people to effectively implement their choices is of far greater dignity than
the substance of any particular choice itself. So while the Constitution grants
no positive rights to particular legislative outcomes, it does give the citizen
a positive right to participate in effective political activity-subject only to
the negative rights which serve to limit that right. While this positive right
does not trump negative rights, its presence in the background of constitutional analysis is significant.
This positive background right provides the best explanation of why uniform interpretation of federal constitutional provisions is essential. Improper
extension of an antimajoritarian right by the courts of one state would
frustrate the right of the citizen to effective implementation of constitutionally permitted political choices. While state constitutions, which are products
of the people's will within that state, may certainly go further in limiting
state government, preclusion of majorities on federal grounds must remain
within uniform standards.

112. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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Recognition of this background right to effective democratic processes will
have an impact on the Constitution as a whole. This impact must be analyzed
in greater detail. It may, for example, provide strong support for a theory
of the evolution of antimajoritarian rights along the lines suggested by
Professor Wellington. In doing so, it may partially restore the early view
of judicial review (elaborated by Professor Nelson) as consistent with, rather
than opposed to, the democratic character of the constitutional system. A
Supreme Court which explicitly recognizes its obligation to insure that the
will of the people is respected should find more public acceptance for its
decisions on those occasions when it must enforce antimajoritarian rights.

